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USIB-D-46.4/10
(COMIREX-D-25.7/3)
1 February 1968
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Requirement for Additional BLACK SHIELD
Coverage of North Korea

REFERENCE : OPCEN 1800, 30 January 1968

1. The United States Intelligence Board as of this date approved the recommendations on the subject contained in paragraph 2. of the report by the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation transmitted by the reference message.

2. Admiral Taylor, as CIA Member, concurred with the recommendations subject to the following comment:

"With regard to paragraph 2.B., I do not feel that COMIREX, on its own, should shift satellite coverage to the 'maximum extent possible' without first advising USIB what other coverage would be sacrificed. I do feel that they should do all feasible, without further reference to USIB if high priority coverage elsewhere does not suffer as a result."

The Chairman of USIB has concurred in the above comment.

3. The Chairman, COMIREX and the Deputy Director, NRO have been informed of the above USIB actions.

25X1

NRO review(s) completed

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25X1

USIB-D-46.4/10
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4. Accordingly the attached copy of the COMIREX report as transmitted by the reference is circulated herewith for information and guidance of all concerned.



Executive Secretary

Attachment



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MESSAGE

TO : United States Intelligence Board
FROM : Executive Secretary, USIB
SUBJECT : Requirement for Additional BLACK SHIELD Coverage
of North Korea

The following COMIREX report on the subject is transmitted for urgent consideration by the USIB. It is requested that USIB Members advise the Secretariat if possible by noon Wednesday, 31 January, of their concurrence or other views on the COMIREX recommendations stated below.

1. COMIREX has reviewed the coverage obtained on [redacted] that acquired excellent quality photography of most of the southern half of North Korea, including the DMZ, and which succeeded in locating the Pueblo. Despite the overall excellence of coverage, there were certain important deficiencies and unfilled requirements as follows:

A. Seven major North Korean jet-capable airfields were not photographed, of these, five were within the area covered [redacted] but were either obscured by clouds or were too far on the oblique. The remaining two jet-capable airfields located north of the area covered were not accessible.

[redacted]
Of particular importance among significant airfields not covered, is Uiju, the normal operating base for most of North Korea's IL-28 bombers. As a result, only 12 of the 80 IL-28s currently estimated in the North Korean inventory were located [redacted]

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Attachment

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(COMIREX-D-25.7/3)

1 February 1968

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B. Coverage was not acquired of the Naval facility at Mayang Do which normally serves the North Korean submarine fleet, nor was coverage obtained of several key naval bases in Northeastern Korea, some of which lie a considerable distance from either the Chinese or Soviet frontiers. A requirement for current naval order of battle information was emphasized by the detection of three additional KOMAR class guided missile patrol boats on the recent mission. These boats, observed at Wonsan, increased our order of battle estimate to seven. Immediate coverage of the important naval bases further north along the northeastern coast is required to insure awareness of any important changes to North Korean naval order of battle in that area.

C. Because of the possibility of third party intervention or assistance, an up-to-date data base of high resolution photography of the northern portion of North Korea is still required.

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In addition to the immediate need for obtaining the baseline coverage discussed above, we envisage a requirement for recoverage of the installations photographed on [redacted] particularly in the area of the DMZ, to determine if significant changes to order of battle have occurred.

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2. It is recommended that USIB:

A. Approve requirements for additional BX missions as follows:

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(1) A mission to be flown as soon as political and operational considerations permit

25X1

- 2 -

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to obtain coverage of targets missed by BX Mission []
and to obtain coverage of as much of the area inaccessible
to [] as may be feasible,

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(2) A later mission flown so as to obtain
recovery of southern areas, particularly along the
DMZ, which can be used to determine if significant
changes have occurred, and

B. Note that COMIREX will assure that future satellite
reconnaissance missions are programmed to supplement BLACK
SHIELD coverage to the maximum extent possible.

- End of Message -

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25X1

- 3 -

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